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Attorney ethics are complicated in the sense that there are a multitude 
of sources that propound information regarding attorney ethics and a 
general lack of uniformity amongst them.  Lawyers are guided primarily by 
three sources: the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (hereinafter “Model Rules”), the laws of the state in which the 
lawyer practices, and the individual attorney’s “moral compass.”1 
Attorney compliance with the ethical boundaries proscribed by the 
American Bar Association (hereinafter “ABA”) is largely self-imposed, 
while the courts retain the ultimate enforcement authority.2  The ABA 
Model Rules are only a loose framework; they are not an exhaustive code 
featuring the answer to every possible ethical dilemma an attorney might 
face.3  As a result, attorneys must go beyond the Rules to answer difficult, 
“grey area” questions in which the ABA Model Rules are silent.4 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal ethics question this comment seeks to shed light upon 
concerns the topic of surreptitious recordings, specifically the ethics 
invoked where an attorney surreptitiously records their client.  This 
comment will discuss and analyze whether it is ethical for an attorney to 
surreptitiously record their clients, and if it is, under what circumstances. 
This comment is divided into multiple sections.  Section II provides 
relevant background information on the topic.  Section III of this comment 
analyzes the two ABA Model Rules that are most pertinent to the issue: 
Rule 1.6 concerning the Duty of Confidentiality and Rule 8.4 concerning 
Attorney Misconduct.  Section IV of this comment provides a historical 
guide on how the ABA has approached surreptitious recordings and their 
current opinion on the topic.  Section V highlights how different 
jurisdictions approach the issue.  Section VI provides analysis of Sections 
III-V and the ethical issue of surreptitious recording.  Finally, Section VII 
proposes possible solutions to the issue of surreptitious recording. 
More specifically, this comment focuses on the ethical issues 
surrounding single-party consent jurisdictions.  In such jurisdictions, only 
one party to a conversation needs to consent to a recording for said 
 
 1  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 2  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 3  Id. 
 4  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SECTOR LAWYERS: ETHICS: 
PUBLIC LAWYERS AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/resources/ethics/ (last visited Sept. 
28, 2019). 
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recording to be legal.5  In a single-party jurisdiction, an attorney taping the 
conversation could provide his or her “consent” to such taping thus making 
the recording legal.  Alternatively, if an attorney were to record a client 
surreptitiously in a two-party consent jurisdiction they are necessarily 
breaking the law, thereby violating Model Rule 8.4(b), which states that it 
is attorney misconduct to willfully break the law.6  Therefore, this comment 
focuses on recording in a single-party consent jurisdiction, where the ethics 
of surreptitious recording are murkier and unclear.  This comment argues 
that surreptitious recording of clients is extremely problematic, mostly 
unethical, and should only be done in rare, specific circumstances after the 
attorney has weighed the potential consequences to all involved parties. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The recent controversy involving President Donald J. Trump and his 
former personal attorney, Michael Cohen, prompted this comment.  Cohen 
worked for the Trump Organization (hereinafter “Organization”) beginning 
in 2007, quickly earning a reputation as a fixer and assuming different roles 
in the Organization.7  Cohen was instrumental in guiding then candidate 
Trump through the primaries and general election during the 2016 
presidential campaign.8  Prior to the general election, Cohen’s guidance led 
to the campaign distributing payments to women who alleged they had 
extramarital affairs with Trump.9  These payments were made to keep the 
women from further discussing their allegations with the press.10  Despite 
Cohen’s efforts, news of these payments eventually leaked.11  As media 
stories of the payments developed, many sources speculated that Trump 
 
 5  MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., Laws on Recording Conversations in all 50 
States, https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/RECORDING-
CONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf (last visited November 20, 2019).  
 6  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 7  William K. Rashbaum, Danny Hakim, Brian M. Rosenthal, Emily Flitter & Jesse 
Drucker, How Michael Cohen, Trump’s Fixer, Built a Shadowy Business Empire, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (May 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/business/michael-cohen-
lawyer-trump.html. 
 8  Id.  
 9  Rebecca Ballhaus & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Denies Knowledge of $130,000 Payment 
to Stormy Daniels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 5, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-denies-knowledge-of-130-000-payment-to-former-
porn-star-1522963827. 
 10  See Id. Although Trump originally claimed that he had no personal involvement in 
payments to Stormy Daniels, he later acknowledged that he had indeed given a retainer to 
Cohen to offset his personal costs. 
 11  Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Payment for 
Adult-Film Star’s Silence, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-lawyer-arranged-130-000-payment-for-adult-film-stars-
silence-1515787678.   
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was directly involved in making the payments; however, no concrete 
evidence surfaced to confirm their suspicions.12  Trump adamantly 
maintained he had no connection to the payments and denied any direct 
involvement in them.13 
In early April 2018, Cohen’s office and home were raided by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in furtherance of the United States 
Department of Justice’s investigation into potential Russian interference 
and collusion in the 2016 Presidential Election.14  The FBI seized numerous 
records and documents, including those relating to a payment made to 
former adult film actress Stephanie Clifford, professionally known as 
Stormy Daniels.15  Some of the records seized in the raids suggested that 
Trump and Cohen attempted to purchase former Playboy Playmate Karen 
McDougal’s publishing rights from American Media Incorporated.16 
Of particular importance to this discussion is the medium the evidence 
seized by the FBI was in.17  Rather than traditional written records such as 
personal notes or memos, the FBI found secret recordings Cohen took of 
conversations with his client, Donald Trump.18  After the existence of these 
recordings became public knowledge, Cohen acknowledged that he 
habitually taped his clients rather than taking traditional handwritten 
notes.19  Trump was unaware that his attorney had recorded their 
discussions about the payments and was understandably not happy when 
this information came to light.20 
 
 12  See Rebecca Ballhaus & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Denies Knowledge of $130,000 
Payment to Stormy Daniels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 5, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-denies-knowledge-of-130-000-payment-to-former-
porn-star-1522963827.  
 13  Id. 
 14  Erica Orden, Rebecca Ballhaus & Michael Rothfeld, Agents Raid Office of Trump 
Lawyer Michael Cohen in Connection with Stormy Daniels Payments, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (April 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-raids-trump-lawyers-office-
1523306297. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Rebecca Ballhaus, Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Michael Cohen Taped 
Conversation with Trump about Buying Rights to Playmate’s Story, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(July 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-cohen-taped-conversation-with-
trump-about-buying-rights-to-playmates-story-1532112954 (American Media Inc. owned 
the rights to Karen McDougal’s story claiming that she had an extramarital affair with 
Trump. Candidate Trump and Michael Cohen were discussing how to purchase the rights.). 
 17  Id.  
 18  Id.  
 19  Deanna Paul, Michael Cohen Secretly Tape-Recorded Trump. Does that make him a 
Bad Lawyer? WASHINGTON POST (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/25/michael-cohen-secretly-
recorded-trump-does-that-make-him-a-bad-lawyer/?utm_term=.c6a27d93cf1a. 
 20  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2018, 5:34 AM), 
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The Trump-Cohen attorney-client relationship and its eventual 
breakdown is a useful example that provides real world context to the 
issues discussed in this comment.  The Trump-Cohen fallout illustrates 
potential consequences of surreptitiously recording clients.  The decision to 
use this example is not, and should not be understood as, supporting or 
criticizing the Presidency.  Rather, it is an opportunity to use a high-profile 
example to further an ethics discussion. 
III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT IN THE CONTEXT OF SURREPTITIOUS RECORDINGS 
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
are the current ethics rules which guide attorneys in the ethical practice of 
law.21  The Model Rules provide a framework that nearly every legal 
jurisdiction in the country has adopted; however, each state maintains the 
ability to adopt or modify the Model Rules before enacting them within 
their borders.22  The framework lays out the ethical obligations that all 
attorneys owe to their clients, adversaries, and third parties.23  Although the 
Model Rules do not discuss surreptitious recording, they do speak of the 
Duty of Confidentiality and of Attorney Misconduct.24  This section 
provides an overview of these topics and explains their relevance to the 
issue of surreptitious recording. 
 
 
 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1022097879253635072?lang=en. (“What kind of 
lawyer would tape a client? So sad! Is this a first, never heard of it before? Why was the 
tape so abruptly terminated (cut) while I was presumably saying positive things? I hear there 
are other clients and many reporters that are taped – can this be so? Too bad!”); see also 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 21, 2018, 5:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1020642287725043712?lang=en. 
(“Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer’s office (early in the 
morning) – almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client – 
totally unheard of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did 
nothing wrong.”). 
 21  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, LAW OF 
LAWYERING §1.03 SOURCES OF LAW CONSTITUTING THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed., 2019-1 
Supp. 2014). 
 22  LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: PRACTICE GUIDES, MISCONDUCT 
AND DISCIPLINE, DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT. (North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia have 
added to the definition of Rule 8.4(c) to prevent fraud if that conduct reflects adversely on 
the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer). 
 23  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §2.01 THE CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP: PART I OF THE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
 24  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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A. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 
ABA Model Rule 8.4 is an all-encompassing rule that requires 
attorneys to obey all of the Model Rules.25  If an attorney violates any of 
the Model Rules, they inherently also violate Rule 8.4.26  Although Rule 
8.4 is extremely comprehensive and has many subsections addressing a 
long list of scenarios, for the purposes of this comment it is only necessary 
to focus on Rule 8.4(a), Rule 8.4(b) and Rule 8.4(c).27  Model Rule 8.4 is 
relevant to this discussion because some jurisdictions have determined that 
surreptitious recording is inherently deceitful, while other jurisdictions 
have not.28  This will be addressed in more detail in Section V. 
Rule 8.4(a) states that a lawyer shall not “violate or attempt to violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to 
do so, or do so through the acts of another.”29  Rule 8.4(b) states that a 
lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects “on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.”30  Rule 8.4(c) 
states that an attorney shall not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”31  This Model Rule not only applies to 
the attorney’s professional practice, but also applies to their actions outside 
the practice of law.32  This highlights the fact that attorneys must be 
cognizant of ethical conduct both within and outside of their practice, as 
they are held to a higher standard of conduct in society than an ordinary 
citizen.33  Following this logic, in a single-party consent jurisdiction an 
ordinary citizen could secretly tape conversations without serious 
consequences, while attorneys may be subject to punishment for similar 
actions. 
 
 
 25  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §69.02 OVERVIEW. 
 26  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §69.03 VIOLATION OF A RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
AS MISCONDUCT. 
 27  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 28  See discussion infra Section V. 
 29  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 30  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 31  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 32  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 976 A.2d 245, 261 (Md. 2009) (stating 
that Rule 8.4(c) can be violated even if the conduct occurred outside of the practice of law); 
see also In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2006) (disciplining lawyer under rule 8.4(c) for 
embezzling funds from his real estate closing company); see generally In re Ellis, 204 P.3d 
1161 (Kan. 2009) (disciplining lawyer for stealing food from the office cafeteria and lying 
about it when asked by superiors).  
 33  See e.g., Johnson, 976 A.2d at 261.  
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B. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 concerns the confidentiality of information 
between an attorney and client.34  An obligation exists for attorneys to 
preserve client confidences, prevent disclosure of information about a 
client, and prohibits use such information in the adverse interest of a 
client.35  The Rule prevents attorneys from voluntarily discussing or giving 
information about a client to anyone.36  Model Rule 1.6(a) concerns a broad 
category of information “relating to the representation of a client” that is 
prohibited from disclosure, and therefore, an attorney must not reveal it.37  
Model Rule 1.6(b) contains a list of exceptions, which permit a lawyer to 
disclose information when a lawyer “reasonably believes” that disclosure is 
necessary.38 
The duty of confidentiality is the foundation of the attorney-client 
relationship.39  The duty enables the attorney to gain the trust of clients and 
serve them more effectively.40  It allows the client to fully engage in their 
representation and enables them to be honest with their attorneys.41  
However, this enhanced attorney-client relationship comes at a cost.42  
Occasionally, an attorney learns information that would be useful or 
beneficial to a third party; nonetheless, the attorney is not permitted to 
disclose such information.  Clients have legitimate expectations that the 
information they disclose to their attorney will remain confidential.43  The 
confidential relationship between attorney and client enhances client 
autonomy and gives the client a sense that the legal system is capable of 
fair play.44  Indeed Rule 1.6 is extremely relevant to the topic of 
surreptitious recording of clients because the clients’s words, phrases, and 
tone are recorded verbatim without their knowledge.45  Furthermore, secret 
 
 34  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 35  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.  
 36  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 37  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2018). 
 38  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2018); Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
v. Massaro, 47 F. App’x 618, 619 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 
F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992) (stating that the crime-fraud exception to both the duty of 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege allows an attorney to disclose confidential 
information in certain circumstances)). 
 39  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 40  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 41  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 42  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) 
 43  Id. 
 44  Albert Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among 
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 352 (1981).  
 45  See discussion infra Section IV. B.  
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recording has the ability to destroy the trust and confidence a client has in 
their attorney, and has the potential to harm the attorney-client relationship.  
Section IV will explore these issues in greater detail. 
IV. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S STANCE ON SURREPTITIOUS 
RECORDING 
The American Bar Association is one of the preeminent authorities in 
the field of legal ethics.46 The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility 
houses numerous committees that provide leadership in developing and 
interpreting scholarly sources in the field of legal ethics.47  The ABA 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (hereinafter 
“Committee”) exists to answer important ethical questions and help 
interpret state-adopted Rules of Professional Conduct.48  The Committee 
provides this guidance through of written opinions.49  The Committee 
promulgates two types of opinions: Formal Opinions and Informal 
Opinions.50  Formal Opinions address matters that are of interest to both the 
general public and the bar.51  Informal Opinions address specific inquiries 
and a particular set of facts.52  However, like the Model Rules themselves, 
these opinions are advisory, and thus not binding.53  Nonetheless, ABA 
ethics opinions are cited frequently by courts as they assist with 
interpretation of the Model Rules.54  The ABA has issued a handful of 
 
 46  GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, LEGAL ETHICS RESEARCH GUIDE, 
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/legal_ethics (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 47  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/ (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2019) (The Center for Professional Responsibility engages in fields such as 
professional regulation, professionalism, and client protection).  
 48 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/
ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). Note that the committee 
currently known as the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was formerly 
known as the Committee on Professional Ethics from 1958 through 1971, the committees 
are for all intents and purposes functional equivalents and for the purposes of this comment 
will be collectively referred to as one and the same, hereinafter “Committee”.  
 49  GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, LEGAL ETHICS RESEARCH GUIDE, 
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/legal_ethics (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.  
 54  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/
ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
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opinions discussing attorneys and their surreptitious recordings of clients, 
adversaries, and third parties.55  This section will outline their holdings and 
show how the ABA’s stance has evolved over time. 
A. ABA Informal Opinion 1008 
In 1967, the Committee issued ABA Informal Opinion 1008, titled 
“Lawyer Tape Recording Telephone Conversation of Client Without 
Client’s Knowledge.”56  In addressing the question presented, the 
Committee divided the problem into two separate issues: (1) is it 
permissible for an attorney to tape a conversation with a client, when the 
client is unaware that the conversation is being recorded?; and (2) does the 
disclosure of the recording’s substance conform with the ethical rules?57 
In addressing the first issue, the Committee noted that a particular 
jurisdiction may have a statute prohibiting the taping of a conversation 
without the consent of all parties.58  The opinion then referenced Formal 
Opinion 7 and Informal Opinion 262.59  These ethics opinions suggest that 
attorneys must be candid with their clients, and therefore recording a 
telephone conversation without the client’s knowledge could potentially 
violate this requirement. 
Informal Opinion 1008 extended this principle to the surreptitious 
recordings of clients.60  The Committee concluded that an attorney who 
wishes to record a conversation with a client must first alert the client that 
they intend to record the conversation.61  It stated that if the attorney did 
not obtain the client’s consent, the attorney could not ethically record the 
conversation.62  Such a recording would be a violation of the obligation of 
candor and fairness.63 
In addressing the second issue of disclosure, the Committee stated that 
an attorney must not disclose the substance of the recording as it would 
invoke the attorney-client privilege and the fact that an attorney has an 
obligation to maintain their client’s confidences.64  In sum, the Committee 
recognized that an attorney must not secretly record a conversation with a 
client, that the attorney must alert the client if they plan to record the 
 
 55  See discussion infra Section IV. A, B, C. 
 56  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).  
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967). 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
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conversation, and that the attorney must not disclose any substance of said 
recording, as the attorney has a duty to protect the client’s confidences. 
B. ABA Formal Opinion 337 
In 1974, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 337, which reiterated the conclusion 
previously reached by the Committee in Informal Opinion 1008.65  The 
ABA wrote Formal Opinion 337 to address the technological advancements 
in recording devices and their use by individuals in the legal profession.66  
The Opinion addressed whether it was ethical for an attorney to secretly 
record three different groups of people: (1) clients, (2) other attorneys and 
adversaries, and (3) third parties.67  Affirming Informal Opinion 1008, the 
Committee advised that it is unethical for an attorney to surreptitiously 
record their own clients or adversaries.68  The Committee emphasized that 
an attorney who wished to ethically record a conversation must alert all 
parties to the conversation.69 
The Committee had difficulty, however, in answering whether 
recording third parties is permissible.70  After contemplating the question, 
the Committee determined that except in exceptional circumstances, it is 
both impermissible and unethical for an attorney to secretly record a third 
party without their knowledge.71 
The Committee acknowledged that third party recording would 
disrupt public confidence in the legal profession and emphasized the need 
for the public to trust attorneys.72  It also stated that secret tapings would 
violate Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
expressed the idea that attorneys must avoid professional impropriety.73 
 
 
 65  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). 
 66  Id. 
 67  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id. 
 71  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974) (explaining 
that the Committee made an exception that permits a prosecutor or an Attorney General to 
surreptitiously record a client if the recording adheres strictly to the Constitutional 
requirements. However, the Committee also made clear that even though a recording may 
theoretically be legal, it does not per se make the recording ethical. The Committee allowed 
leeway for unethical behavior from governmental attorneys in specific circumstances. The 
Committee declined to outline specific instances in which this behavior would be 
permissible.). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id.; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
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Lastly, the Committee advised that an attorney who secretly tapes 
another individual would be in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.74  Disciplinary Rule 1-
102(A)(4) states, “A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”75 
The ethical rules in combination with the public perception of 
attorneys prompted the Committee to ultimately advise against all secret 
tape recordings.76  Thus a broad and sweeping per se rule that disapproved 
of all secret tapings, irrespective of identity of those involved in the 
conversation was promulgated by the Committee.77 
C. The ABA’s Current Stance: Formal Opinion 01-422 
Formal Opinion 337 stood untouched for nearly 30 years until 2001, 
when the Committee revisited the topic.78  Formal Opinion 01-422 marked 
a dramatic change in course from the previously longstanding precedent set 
by Formal Opinion 337.79 
The Committee shifted its longstanding stance and advised that 
surreptitious recording is not deceitful.80  In Formal Opinion 01-422, the 
Committee asserted that the act of surreptitiously recording a conversation 
without consent of the other parties does not violate the Model Rules, 
unless the recording occurs in a jurisdiction that forbids such recording by 
law.81  To commit an ethics violation in a single-party consent jurisdiction, 
the act of recording needs to occur in conjunction with other independently 
unethical behavior.82  Although the Committee did not affirmatively 
advocate for attorneys to adopt the practice of surreptitious recording, it 
also did not explicitly claim that to do so would be unethical, as the 
Committee previously had in Formal Opinion 337.83 
 
 
 
 74  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 75  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
This is the predecessor to the current Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c), which states 
that “a lawyer shall not [ . . .  e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.” 
 76  ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967). 
 77  Id. 
 78  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). 
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The Committee provided numerous reasons for the adoption of this 
new standard.  It noted that in 1983 the ABA adopted the new Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct and updated their ethics rules.84  Some states and 
bar associations claimed that Formal Opinion 337 did not align with the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore, Opinion 337 was 
outdated and inapplicable to the modern practice of law.85  The ABA 
acknowledged that their opinions are merely advisory, rendering the 
opinions non-binding on any state or jurisdiction.86  As a result, a lack of 
consistency emerged among states.  Some states, such as Mississippi, 
adopted the standard, while other states such as Colorado, did not.87  Other 
states, including Oklahoma, Utah, and Maine complained about Opinion 
337 and advocated that the ABA reevaluate their stance on surreptitious 
recordings.88 
To add further confusion, there were intra-state bar association 
disagreements on the ethics of surreptitious recording.89  For example, the 
New York County Bar Association advised that lawyers could record a 
conversation where the other party or parties did not consent.90  
Conversely, the New York City Bar Association opined that lawyers should 
not record other parties without their consent; however, it did suggest a 
potential exception for attorneys conducting criminal investigations.91  
Interestingly, neither of these bar association opinions matched the New 
York State Bar Association’s stance, which condemned all recordings 
unless all parties to the conversation are aware that their conversation is 
being recorded.92 
The states that heavily criticized Opinion 337 believed that the per se 
rule forbidding secret recordings was too restrictive and demanded that 
they be granted some discretion to draft and comply with the ethics opinion 
to the extent it may be appropriate in their local practice.93  In response to 
these issues, the ABA created a framework that each state can apply to 
 
 84  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001); see 
generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 85  Id. See discussion infra Section IV. C. 
 86  Id. (Explaining that some states simply chose not to follow Opinion 337 and ignored 
the ABA’s advice).  
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. (Explaining that the states found the per se rule of Formal Opinion 337 to be too 
stringent and said that only a surreptitious recording in combination with other deceptive 
behavior is unethical.). 
 89  Id. 
 90  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id.  
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determine whether surreptitious recordings by attorneys are ethically 
permissible.94 
The first step in the framework is to ask whether the state or 
jurisdiction has a law that forbids single-party consent recording.95  If a 
state is an all-party consent state and an attorney records without 
permission, the attorney in question likely violates Rules 8.4(b) and (c).96  
If the state is a single-party consent state, the attorney must then use their 
best judgment when recording their clients.97  The Committee advised that 
secret recording should only occur where the attorney conducting such 
recording knows that the client would accept and allow the recording to 
occur.98  In deciding, the Committee did not actively support surreptitious 
recordings; rather, it noted that it would prefer attorneys to be upfront and 
honest with their clients, and advise them that they are recording a 
conversation.99 
V. INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES 
Nearly every state in the United States has adopted the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.100  The Model Rules 
provide that “failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed 
by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”101  Section 19 of 
the Scope of the Model Rules states that a disciplinary body will analyze 
the lawyer’s conduct based on the facts and circumstances that existed at 
the time of the conduct at issue.102  This section lastly states that the 
possibility and the severity of such discipline will be determined by the 
following: the willfulness of the attorney’s conduct, the seriousness of the 
breach, and the outside influences and extenuating factors involved in the 
 
 94  Id.  
 95  Id. 
 96  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b)-(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).   
 97  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).  
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  American Bar Association, Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ (last visited November 16, 
2019); The State Bar of California, Rules of Professional Conduct, 
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-
Conduct (last visited November 16, 2019) (According to the ABA, California has not 
adopted the Model Rules.  However, California recently adopted new Rules of Professional 
Conduct on November 1, 2018 that align the State with the ABA rules.). 
 101  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 102  Id. 
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ethical violation.103  This section also highlights the fact that although the 
ABA provides a general statement on how the Model Rules should be 
applied, not all jurisdictions apply them uniformly.  Instead, the Model 
Rules are applied and interpreted at the state’s discretion; therefore, the 
disciplinary outcomes are wildly different.  For example, Cohen’s 
surreptitious recording of his client could be ethical according to some 
jurisdictions, while other jurisdictions would reprimand and sanction him 
for such actions.104 
A. Subjective Context Jurisdiction: Mississippi 
Concerning surreptitious recordings, Mississippi can be considered a 
“subjective” jurisdiction because the State does not have a per se rule 
prohibiting attorneys from secretly recording their clients.105  Rather, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi tends to determine ethical violations on this 
topic on a case-by-case basis.106  This individualized approach can be 
described as one of pragmatism and flexibility, utilizing the “context-of-
the-circumstances” to resolve the matter before the court.107 
In Attorney M v. Mississippi Bar, the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
found that a plaintiff’s lawyer who surreptitiously recorded telephone 
conversations with a potential defendant did not commit an ethical 
violation.108  The issue arose during a medical malpractice case in which 
Attorney M represented the plaintiff.109  During discovery, plaintiff’s 
attorney telephoned “Dr. C” on two occasions, tape recording both of the 
phone calls without Dr. C’s knowledge or permission.110  Testimony 
revealed that Dr. C assumed that his conversations were recorded, but his 
suspicions were not confirmed until Attorney M sent Dr. C a letter in the 
mail informing the doctor of the recorded telephone conversations.111 
The Mississippi State Bar filed a complaint against Attorney M after 
his actions became public, alleging that his conduct violated the Mississippi 
Rules of Professional Conduct.112  The Complaint Tribunal found that 
 
 103  Id.  
 104  Contra discussion infra Section V. A and Section V. B.   
 105  Allison A. Vana, Note: Attorney Private Eyes: Ethical Implications of a Private 
Attorney’s Decision to Surreptitiously Record Conversations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605, 
1632 (2003). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 1631. 
 108  Attorney M v. Mississippi Bar, 621 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1992).  
 109  Id. at 221. 
 110  Id. at 222. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Id.  
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Attorney M violated Rule 8.4(c) and Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules; 
Attorney M subsequently appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi.113 
The court began their analysis by observing that the Complaint 
Tribunal followed the framework outlined in ABA Formal Opinion 337, 
which forbade any secret recording by attorneys.114  The court disagreed 
with the Complaint Tribunal’s heavy reliance on Opinion 337, because the 
State of Mississippi had never formally adopted the opinion and instead 
preferred to adjudicate matters on an individual basis.115  The court favored 
the holding in Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar over the Committee’s 
stance in Opinion 337.116 
The court preferred the reasoning in Netterville because the case 
produced a more applicable and flexible rule that applies to all attorneys, 
instead of carving out exceptions as Opinion 337 had.117  The court found 
no basis to apply a standard that treated prosecuting attorneys and private 
attorneys differently.118  It noted that there are times that a recording could 
be used for improper and unethical purposes, like “blackmail or to gain an 
unfair advantage.”119  However, the court found no improper motive and, 
therefore, Attorney M had not violated Rule 8.4 because his conduct was 
not dishonest, fraudulent, deceptive, or misrepresentative in nature.120 
Although the above examples appear as though Mississippi is lenient 
in disciplinary actions concerning surreptitious recordings, they have 
punished other attorneys for such conduct.  In Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, for 
example, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the Chancery Court’s 
decision to remove a trustee as a result of the trustee’s repeated 
surreptitious recording of a co-trustee.121  The controversy arose after the 
passing of Richard Wilbourn II, who left his considerable interest in 
Citizens National Bank Corporation Holding Company to his wife, Deanna 
Wilbourn, and their son, Richard Wilbourn III.122  The holding company 
 
 113  Id.  
 114  Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 222–23. 
 115  Id. at 223. 
 116  Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 223; see also Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 
So.2d 878 (1981) (stating that surreptitious tape recording is not unethical when the act, 
“considered within the context of the circumstances then existing,” does not rise to the level 
of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). 
 117  Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 223. See discussion supra note 71. The court recognized 
that Opinion 337 only carved out exceptions for certain government employed attorneys. 
 118  Id. at 223. 
 119  Id. at 224 (stating that mere taping is not the issue, rather the determining factor is 
how the attorney actually uses the tapes). 
 120  Id. at 224. 
 121  Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So.3d 360, 372 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).  
 122  Id. at 363-64.  
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shares were held in trust by Deanna and Richard III, with the main purpose 
to ensure Deanna an annual income for the remainder of her life.123  In 
addition to being co-trustees, Deanna and Richard III also had an attorney-
client relationship.124  Richard III was a partner of a law firm that 
represented Deanna for numerous years; he had advised her on buying real 
estate in Florida, created a life insurance trust for her, and advised her on a 
potential lawsuit regarding Hurricane Katrina damage.125 
Richard III secretly tape-recorded discussions with Deanna.126  The 
court took this fact seriously, as Richard III was not only a co-trustee, but 
was also Deanna’s attorney.127  The court noted that in Mississippi, the 
main factors to determine whether a surreptitious recording is unethical are 
the reason and manner in which the attorney uses the recordings.128  The 
court of appeals agreed with the chancery judge, who determined that 
Richard III intended to use the secret recordings in an attempt to have his 
client declared incompetent and removed as a trustee.129  The court of 
appeals affirmed the removal of Richard III as co-trustee.130  It reasoned 
that an attorney who uses a secret recording to gain an unfair advantage 
over his or her client has committed an unethical, and possibly illegal, 
act.131  Although Richard III was not sanctioned by the Mississippi State 
Bar for surreptitiously recording his client, his removal as a trustee was 
directly correlated to the findings that his behavior was unethical.132 
As shown, Mississippi does not have a hard and fast rule regarding 
surreptitious recording. Instead, their courts determine the specific facts of 
the issue at hand, the circumstances under which the recording was made, 
the intent of the attorney, and the purpose of which the tapes would be 
used.  Only after weighing these factors does a Mississippi court determine 
if a secret recording is unethical.  However, as will be discussed below, not 
every state is as liberal as Mississippi. 
 
 123  Id. at 364-65. 
 124  Id. at 375. 
 125  Id. at 366. 
 126  Id. at 366. 
 127  Wilbourn, 106 So.3d at 375. 
 128  Id. at 371. 
 129  Id. at 371-72. 
 130  Id. at 372. 
 131  Id. at 371. 
 132  Id. at 372.  
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B. Objective Standard Jurisdictions 
1. South Carolina 
Objective jurisdictions can be characterized as jurisdictions that do 
not permit private attorneys to surreptitiously record their clients under any 
circumstance.  In these jurisdictions, attorneys who surreptitiously record 
their clients are typically sanctioned for unethical behavior.  The 
circumstances and facts surrounding the recording are not taken into 
consideration by the courts. 
Although South Carolina does not have a per se rule prohibiting 
surreptitious recordings, their approach to the issue is far more rigid than 
Mississippi’s.  The Supreme Court of South Carolina has consistently 
determined that surreptitious recording is unethical; however, it does 
permit attorneys involved with a law enforcement agency to ethically 
surreptitiously record. 
In In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, the attorney in 
question represented a client involved in a motor vehicle accident.133  The 
attorney subsequently called the other driver involved in the collision, 
without disclosing that he was an attorney for his client or advising the 
driver that he was recording their conversation.134  The attorney attempted 
to use the recording during the deposition of the driver, and opposing 
counsel objected on the propriety of the recording.135  The Court held that 
any time an attorney records a conversation with an adversary or potential 
adversary without the consent of all parties to record, the attorney violates 
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), which provides that a lawyer shall not 
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”136 
In the years since In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina created limited exceptions allowing 
attorneys to record conversations.137  In In re Attorney General’s Petition, 
the court carved out an exception to the rigid standard the state typically 
 
 133  In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 322 S.E.2d 667, 668 (S.C. 1984).  
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 669. (Adopting ABA Formal Opinion 337, which stated that surreptitiously 
recording clients is considered attorney misconduct. Note that DR 1-102(A)(4) was the 
predecessor to ABA Model Rule 8.4(c). The court clarified its position in Matter of S.C. 
Bar, 404 S.E.2d 513 (S.C. 1991), holding that an attorney cannot record a conversation 
without the consent of all parties, regardless of the purpose for which the recording is made, 
the intent of parties to the conversation, whether any confidential information is discussed, 
or whether any party would gain an advantage.). 
 137  See discussion infra Section V. B. 1. 
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imposes.138  There, the court held that it was permissible and therefore 
ethical for an attorney to surreptitiously record a conversation, as long as 
the attorney received clearance from a law enforcement agency conducting 
a criminal investigation.139  However, the court noted that if an attorney 
was accused of an unethical recording, the burden of proof is on the 
attorney to show that the act of recording was ethical.140 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently bolstered this standard 
in In re Nolan.141  This case involved an out-of-state attorney who was 
unfamiliar with South Carolina’s surreptitious recording case law.142  The 
attorney hired private investigators and directed them to go to the 
defendant’s company to secretly record various employees in an attempt to 
capture the employees making statements regarding products produced by 
the company.143  The court determined that this was an unethical recording 
which violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules, because the conduct 
involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.144  Furthermore, 
the Court also held that the attorney violated Rule 5.3(c) of the Model 
Rules because the attorney directed his investigators to act unethically.145 
In general, South Carolina has an easy to follow rule regarding 
surreptitious recording; unless an attorney has permission from a law 
enforcement agency to record or has the permission of all parties to the 
conversation, the attorney may not ethically record the conversation, 
regardless of the purpose of the recording itself.  This is in contrast to the 
rule in Mississippi which generally allows surreptitious recordings, as long 
as the recording is not used in an unethical manner. However, the standard 
in South Carolina is easier to apply in practice since the framework is more 
structured. 
2. Colorado 
Colorado generally adopts the language and assertions the Committee 
set forth in Formal Opinion 337.146  In People v. Smith, the court 
determined that a lawyer’s secret taping of a telephone conversation with a 
 
 138  In re Att’y Gen.’s Petition, 417 S.E.2d 526 (S.C. 1992). 
 139  Id. at 527. 
 140  Id. at 527. 
 141  In re Nolan, 796 S.E.2d 841, 842 (S.C. 2017).  
 142  Id.  
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  
 146  Vana, supra note 105, at 1618–19 (showing Opinion 337 set forth the idea that it was 
impermissible for an attorney to surreptitiously record their client, their adversary, or a third 
party). 
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former client was inherently unethical.147  Smith had a cocaine addiction 
and socialized with other cocaine users.148  Some of Smith’s acquaintances 
were arrested and charged with intent to sell cocaine.149  Smith agreed to 
represent these individuals and throughout the representation, he engaged 
in conversations with them over the telephone.150  Smith was then contacted 
by the District Attorney’s office, informing him that they knew of his 
addiction and believed that he was also involved in the sale of cocaine.151  
After he was contacted by the District Attorney’s office, Smith withdrew 
his representation of his clients and cooperated in the District Attorney’s 
investigation.152  The investigation required Smith to contact his former 
clients multiple times via telephone and record their conversations.153  The 
Colorado Supreme Court stated that even though Smith was acting at the 
District Attorney’s request, his conduct still violated Disciplinary Rule 
102(A)(4), which prohibited conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation.”154 
The court held that “undisclosed use of a recording device necessarily 
involves elements of deception and trickery which do not comport with the 
high standards of candor and fairness to which all attorneys are bound.”155  
The court focused on the repercussions and effects of lawyers taping 
former clients.156  Thus, a private attorney may not tape others as it is 
inherently deceitful to do so and it would disrupt the “foundation of trust 
and confidentiality that is essential to the attorney-client relationship in the 
context of civil as well as criminal proceedings.”157  Colorado has a theme 
of honesty, transparency, and openness in their evaluation of attorney-client 
relationships; secret recordings are actions that are opposite of this theme 
and thus are considered dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful and are 
therefore subject to sanctions.158 
Seemingly there are three different types of jurisdictions in the topic 
of secret recordings.  There are jurisdictions like Mississippi that do not 
have a per se rule against recordings, instead measuring each case by the 
unique circumstances present and by determining the purpose of the 
 
 147  People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1989). 
 148  Id. at 685.   
 149  Id. at 685-86.  
 150  Id. at 686. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Smith, 778 P.2d at 686.  
 154  Id. at 687. 
 155  Id. (citing People v. Selby, 606 P.2d 45, 47 (Colo. 1979). 
 156  Smith, 778 P.2d at 687. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Vana, supra note 105, at 1622–23. 
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recording.  Next, there are jurisdictions such as South Carolina that follow 
the Committee’s guidance set forth in Opinion 337 and only carve out 
exceptions for attorneys secretly recording at the request of a law 
enforcement agency.  Lastly, there are jurisdictions like Colorado that have 
no tolerance for surreptitious recording unless that attorney is a government 
attorney.  The difference between a state like South Carolina and Colorado 
is that the South Carolina rulings allow a private attorney to act on behalf 
of a law enforcement agency, while in Colorado the attorney must be 
employed by the agency, otherwise it is an ethics violation subject to 
sanction. 
 VI. ANALYSIS 
Surreptitious recording of adversaries and third parties is certainly 
questionable behavior.  It is evident and undeniable that it is extremely 
problematic for an attorney to surreptitiously record clients.  Attorneys and 
clients exchange confidential communication, which is defined as 
“information exchanged between two people who (1) have a relationship in 
which private communications are protected by law and (2) intend that the 
information be kept in confidence.”159  The reasoning of the ethics opinions 
cited above rely heavily on the duty of confidentiality and the potential for 
misconduct.  This analysis focuses on these two factors to reveal how 
surreptitious recording has the potential to cause a multitude of problems. 
The duty of confidentiality is one of the most important aspects of the 
attorney-client relationship.  The duty of confidentiality protects a client 
from an attorney’s voluntary disclosure of information gathered through the 
representation of the client.160  This principle cultivates trust between the 
attorney and the client; the client knows that they can talk openly and 
honestly with his or her counsel and have confidence that the information 
will remain out of the public view.161  The duty is important, as it allows 
clients to fully inform their attorneys, which promotes rigorous and 
effective representation.162 
The duty of confidentiality is oftentimes confused with the attorney-
client privilege since they operate in a similar fashion.163  Attorney-client 
privilege is invoked when an attorney is faced with a court order 
 
 159  Confidential Communication.  NOLO’S PLAIN ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 
2009). 
 160   ROGER CRAMTON, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government 
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 302 (1991). 
 161  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 162  EDWARD W. CLEARY, ET AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
175 (2nd ed. 1972).  
 163  See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
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demanding information communicated between the attorney and their 
client.164  The duty of confidentiality is even more protective of the client, 
as it forbids an attorney from revealing any information “relating to the 
representation” of a client.165  The duty of confidentiality is stronger and 
more protective than the attorney-client privilege as the attorney client 
privilege only protects against compelled disclosure, while the duty of 
confidentiality protects against any disclosure relating to the client’s 
representation.166  Indeed, both of these principles are extremely similar in 
nature and are concerned with the improper disclosure of information that a 
client relays to their attorney. 
The attorney-client privilege is a common law principle that was 
formalized in Annesley v. Anglesea in England in 1743.167  The court 
summarized the importance of the privilege saying 
if he [the client] does not fully and candidly disclose 
everything that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be 
in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney 
upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly to 
serve him: therefore, to permit an attorney, whenever he 
thinks fit, to betray that confidence . . . would be of the 
most dangerous consequence, not only to the particular 
client concerned, but to every other man who is or may be 
a client.168 
The court had the foresight to realize the importance of honesty and 
candor between attorney and client.  They recognized that an attorney who 
is ignorant of certain facts will be handicapped and thus will not be able to 
represent the client to their fullest capabilities.  Furthermore, the court 
noted that by preventing disclosure they not only protect the rights and 
information of the client, but also the general public, some of whom will be 
serviced by the attorney in the future. 
Indeed, the concerns of Anglesea still hold true in modern 
jurisprudence.  In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Court recognized the 
importance of honest and frank communications between client and 
counsel.169  It noted that rigorous representation serves the public good, and 
that the best way to achieve proper representation is for an attorney to be 
 
 164  Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).  
 165  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  
 166  Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, THE 
GOOD LAWYER 191 (David Luban ed., 1983). 
 167  Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials. 1139 (1743). 
 168  Id. at 1237.  
 169  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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fully informed by their client.170  The Court quoted the ABA Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1 in support of their 
belief in the attorney-client privilege. 
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of 
the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain 
the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer 
in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to 
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and 
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a 
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his 
client not only facilitates the full development of facts 
essential to proper representation of the client but also 
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.171 
Ethical Consideration 4-1 of the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility is the predecessor to Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.172  Thus, there is support that the duty of 
confidentiality is firmly planted in the modern jurisprudence of this 
country.  It is not merely a theoretical rule that lawyers should follow, but it 
is one of the most important building blocks of the attorney-client 
relationship. 
Although the duty of confidentiality is well established, it does not 
mean that it is not without limits and boundaries.173  The difficult problem 
is defining those boundaries; at what point does the duty of confidentiality 
cease to apply?  At what point can an attorney ethically record a client 
without their consent and knowledge? 
A client who discloses information to an attorney has an 
understanding that the attorney will keep the information confidential; 
however, there are different types of information that a client may reveal to 
their attorney, which complicates the question of confidentiality.  The first 
type contains information that is completely outside the scope of 
confidentiality and thus an attorney may ethically disclose the information 
to an outside party.174  Generally, an attorney may disclose information in 
 
 170  Id.; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The lawyer-client 
privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the 
client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.”); 
see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (recognizing the purpose of the 
privilege to be “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).  
 171  Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 391 (1981).  
 172  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 173  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1091 (1978). 
 174  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
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this category under Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules.175 This category 
includes information such as the intent to commit a future crime or harm 
another person.176  Positive information can be disclosed without an 
overhanging ethics violation; however, this is not applicable to this 
comment, since the focus here is negative disclosure: information that can 
damage a client, cause them to look bad in the public eye, or embarrass 
them.177 
The second category of confidential information is information that 
lies in the grey zone, information an attorney cannot disclose except under 
unique circumstances.178  All else being equal, the attorney cannot disclose 
this type of information because of the duty of confidentiality.  However, if 
the client acts in a particular way such as committing perjury or 
misrepresenting themselves to the court, their attorney can disclose certain 
information to correct the record.179  Attorneys must hold information in 
this category in confidence unless the client acts in a manner which permits 
their attorney to disclose it.180 
The final category of confidential communications is those which 
cannot be disclosed under any circumstances.  The ABA does not 
specifically list or enumerate these communications.  Attorneys must 
absolutely protect the information in this category and cannot reveal it 
under any set of circumstances.181 
Some information is indeed not protected by the duty of 
confidentiality; an attorney can break the duty to prevent future physical 
harm or correct an incorrect record in court.  However, most information 
disclosed to an attorney will not fall under such categories; instead, it will 
fall into the third category, which requires absolute protection and cannot 
be revealed under any circumstances.182  It is in this context that 
surreptitious recording is most problematic, as no circumstances exist to 
permit an attorney to divulge such information to those outside of the 
attorney-client relationship.  The remainder of the comment will discuss the 
various issues that an attorney would face if they were to surreptitiously 
record their client. 
 
 175  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 176  Id.; see also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992). 
 177  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 178  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 179  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 180  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 181  Landesman, supra note 166, at 206. 
 182  Landesman, supra note 166, at 206. 
DEMPSTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:02 PM 
138 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1 
  
A. Timing Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording 
Even if an attorney is ethically permitted to reveal client confidences, 
how does an attorney know when to tape?  Attorneys, like the remainder of 
the world’s population, are not mind readers nor can they predict the future.  
An attorney will not know when to tape their client unless they have prior 
knowledge that a client is going to specifically reveal information that is 
not protected by the duty of confidentiality.  It is unrealistic for a client to 
advise their attorney that they will now start to say something which can be 
disclosed under Rule 1.6(b).  Clients will not announce that they will say 
something important, implicating, or damning; they will just blurt it out.  
The attorney will not have an opportunity to start a recording until after the 
words are spoken.  It is highly unlikely that an attorney will be able to 
specifically record a conversation in which the client says something 
disclosable without recording unimportant and non-disclosable (category 
three) information along with it. 
The obvious argument against this premise is that an attorney can 
record all conversations with every client and therefore they will gather the 
information they seek.  An attorney could install recording equipment in 
their office and ensure that every time a client walks through their door 
they are recording every single word.  However, this is problematic for a 
few reasons.  Although some jurisdictions would determine that this 
behavior is ethically sound, it is highly suspect.183  The entire premise of 
the attorney client relationship is one of openness and candor.  A client 
needs to feel that they can confide in their counsel for the purposes of their 
representation.  If a client were to discover their attorney was secretly 
recording them, their relationship with their attorney would be irreparably 
damaged, as would those of the attorney’s other clients, both past and 
future.  Instead of speaking their minds and offering any possible 
information relating to their representation, the client will be inclined to 
keep their mouth shut and disclose less information than they would 
otherwise.  The relationship will go from open and honest to silenced and 
adversarial.  The client will not wish to say anything that could possibly be 
used against them and their representation will suffer. 
B. Practicality Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording 
Although the Committee did not completely condemn attorneys 
secretly recording their clients in Formal Opinion 01-422, it is highly 
doubtful that they wish this behavior to become the norm in the legal 
industry.  It seems that the ABA advocates for any attorney who is 
 
 183  See discussion supra Section V. B. 
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recording a conversation to inform those being recorded and gain their 
consent.  It would go against the grain for the ABA to advocate for such 
deceptive actions.  There are both positive and negative consequences of 
informing the client of the recording.  If an attorney does not alert their 
client of the recording, the client would not act any differently.  The 
client’s ignorance would be the benefit of the attorney; the client would 
conduct themselves in a normal way, they would not suspect anything, and 
they would interact with their attorney as they would any other meeting.  
The client would share all pertinent information regarding their 
representation and would be more inclined to tell the attorney possibly 
damning or embarrassing information. 
On the flip side, if an attorney were to alert their client that they are 
recording, the attorney risks not getting their client’s complete honesty and 
candor.  The client may leave out specific details that they do not wish to 
be on a verbatim recording.  They might change their story to be more 
pleasing or embellish on their facts.  The discussion will not be frank and 
honest.  If clients knew that there were certain areas that were exempted 
from the scope of confidentiality, clients would avoid such areas, and 
would not reveal information concerning those areas.184  Often, clients 
intertwine these unprotected areas with relevant information, and also omit 
relevant information.185  Restrictions on the duty of confidentiality would 
make individual clients cautious and would negatively affect their 
representation.186 
Although the ABA advised in their latest ethics opinion that secret 
recording is not in and of itself unethical, this conclusion is suspect.187  
Model Rule 8.4(c) states that a lawyer may not engage in deceitful 
behavior.188  The premise that secretly recording a client is not deceitful is 
questionable.  The only way an attorney could record a client without their 
knowledge is through deception.  Although attorneys are not 
misrepresenting themselves, because they are not making a representation 
in general, their conduct is sneaky.  They have the opportunity to alert the 
client of the recording, and their choice not to do so could be classified as 
withholding important information.  Although not deceit by definition, it 
seems that there is a certain amount of avoidance; and through that 
avoidance there is some misrepresentation and deceit. 
 
 184  Landesman, supra note 166, at 206. 
 185  Landesman, supra note 166, at 206. 
 186  Landesman, supra note 166, at 206. 
 187  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
 188  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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C. Evidentiary Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording 
An attorney has a duty of loyalty to their clients; they have to protect 
confidential information at all times unless the client gives permission to 
release the information.189  This duty extends not only to the spoken words; 
it also includes all documents memorializing this confidential 
information.190  If an attorney were to surreptitiously record clients, they 
would create a full and complete record of the conversation.191  The tape 
would be a verbatim record, complete with the exact tone, emotions, and 
phrases of the client. 
Clients do not necessarily know what information an attorney needs 
for proper representation.192  Therefore, when a client is recounting facts or 
their story to their attorney, the pertinent information will be mixed in with 
irrelevant information.  The topics and subject matter of this irrelevant 
information may be of an embarrassing nature or information that a client 
shares in confidence, knowing that their attorney is not permitted to share 
this information with others.193  By tape recording a client, an attorney not 
only gathers the important information necessary for representation, but 
also collects this irrelevant information and memorializes it.  If an attorney 
is taking the meeting with handwritten notes, it is unlikely that an attorney 
will even bother writing down this irrelevant information and will only 
focus on the important facts of the story, simply for brevity’s sake.  By 
creating a verbatim record, all of the information is on the tape.  If the 
recording were to get into the wrong hands, not only would the information 
concerning the representation be in the public eye, but this irrelevant 
information could also be under public scrutiny.  Indeed, the ABA in 
Opinion 01-422 foreshadowed this problem, as taped evidence could be 
subjected to misuse and abuse the duty of confidentiality.194 
As seen in the Trump-Cohen relationship, if their conversation about 
the payments was made without a tape recording and in short memorialized 
notes, there would be less hard evidence of the conversation even taking 
place.  Ignoring the obvious illegality of these payments and the use of an 
attorney’s services in furtherance of these payments, the existence of a 
verbatim record damages the client’s reputation and has the potential to 
create more legal problems in the future.  An attorney’s purpose is to serve 
their clients with the strongest representation and skill.  By recording a 
 
 189  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 190  HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW. 
 191  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
 192  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 193  Landesman, supra note 166, at 203. 
 194  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). 
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client and materializing sensitive information, the attorney ignores and 
neglects their purpose.  They are necessarily harming their client as there is 
a possibility that this recording is put into the pubic scope for all to see.  A 
traditional handwritten note or unrecorded conversation protects client 
information as there is less likelihood that the material will be made public 
and connected specifically to a particular client.  This method protects the 
client’s interests better than any recorded conversation ever could. 
D. Summary 
It is difficult to conclude that surreptitious recording is on its face 
ethical.  Although the ABA permits it in certain circumstances, it seems 
deceptive and deceitful.  In practice, there is no uniform answer to the 
question, different states view the issue differently; some allow it, while 
others strictly forbid it with no exceptions.  However, in the end, the 
question truly boils down to individual attorneys and their judgment.  The 
attorney must decide only after considering all the circumstances and 
possible consequences.  They must be cognizant that surreptitiously 
recording their client could potentially irreparably damage the attorney-
client relationship.  However, if the attorney determines that the situation 
requires such surreptitious recording, the attorney must confirm that there 
is a proper motive for the action and ensure that the client’s representation 
and confidences remain intact.  To do otherwise would be to abuse the 
relationship and jeopardize the client’s confidence in their representation. 
 VII. PROPOSAL 
A. Legislative Solution 
There are two possible remedies that could solve the ethics issue 
discussed in this comment. The first solution is quite simple.  The ethical 
issues surrounding single-party consent jurisdictions are numerous as 
explained above.  The most straightforward solution to nullify these ethical 
issues is to amend the law of recording itself.  If state legislatures were to 
amend their laws to mandate consent of all parties of a conversation, the 
ethics issues would vanish.  As previously explained, Rule 8.4(b) of the 
Model Rules states that it is professional misconduct to “commit a criminal 
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”195  Therefore, if surreptitious 
recording was outlawed by statute, it would necessarily be an ethics 
violation if an attorney were to record their client without their consent.  
However, it is unlikely for this to occur as the federal government and 38 
 
 195  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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individual states are single-party consent jurisdictions.196 
B. American Bar Association Solution 
The ABA could resolve the issue of surreptitious recording in two 
ways.  The first method is to release a new Formal Opinion on surreptitious 
recording that provides specified guidance on when and where an attorney 
could ethically record.  If the ABA were to provide clear cut examples it 
would clarify the issue surrounding the problem. 
The second method the ABA could undertake is through Model Rule 
amendment and annotation.  If the ABA were to specifically amend and 
annotate Rule 8.4(c) to include surreptitious recording as deceptive 
conduct, the ABA could change the way surreptitious recording is viewed.  
If surreptitious recording of clients was considered deceptive, to do so 
would violate the Model Rules and thus attorneys would be vulnerable to 
sanctions or penalties. 
For either of these options to work, state supreme courts would have 
to adopt the ABA’s position.  In the first method, the state supreme courts 
would have to adopt the new Formal Opinion.  Since ABA Formal 
Opinions are not binding on any court, the states would have to voluntarily 
adopt the new opinion and use the opinion in attorney misconduct 
hearings.197  However, it is highly unlikely that all jurisdictions will adopt 
such an opinion.  As explained above, numerous states have different 
methodologies when analyzing the ethics of surreptitious recordings, and it 
is unlikely that these jurisdictions will abandon their precedent because the 
ABA promulgated something new.198 
The second proposed method runs into a similar problem.  Even if the 
ABA were to promulgate an amendment to Model Rule 8.4(c), the 
individual states would still have the discretion to adopt the amendment.  
States do not necessarily need to adopt all of the Rules verbatim and can 
often modify them to their specific needs and requirements.199  Thus, even 
if the ABA were to amend the Rule, a state could strike the modification 
regarding surreptitious recordings. 
Ultimately it seems that any change regarding the act of surreptitious 
recording must come from the state’s willingness to change.  Since the 
ABA does not have any enforcement powers of their own, they are to an 
extent hindered in their ability to promulgate ethical rules or opinions 
which may be unpopular amongst a group of states.  As such, unless 
 
 196  MATTHIESEN, supra note 5.  
 197  See discussion supra Section IV. C.  
 198  See discussion supra Section V.  
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individual states change their views on the ethics of surreptitious recording 
or change their substantive laws, it is unlikely that any tangible change will 
occur. 
 
